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Islamic Law in Iran: Can It Protect the International
Legal Right of Freedom of Religion and Belief?
Jennifer F. Cohen*
[D]ifferences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic.
Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture,
tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations
have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual
and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and
wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and
responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These
differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear.'
Is he then who is a believer like him who is a transgressor? They are not
equal.2
Differences among civilizations are a critical consideration in the
development and enforcement of public international law. As "non-Western"
countries gain a more sophisticated and influential presence in the UN and other
intergovernmental bodies, these bodies are forced to reconcile their historic and
elemental positions with those of member states that may have fundamental
differences in their views of governmental power, human rights, and the role of
international authority.
Religion is one area of particular interest because of its divisive implications
for major players on the world stage. Religious beliefs inform the moral
frameworks of many of the world's most prominent policymakers. Whereas
some nations are self-consciously religious in their policymaking, others, though
potentially equally as informed in their moral structures by religion, claim to be
BA 2006, Cornell University; JD Candidate 2009, The University of Chicago Law School. A big
thank you to Professors Eric Posner and Randolph McLaughlin for their invaluable advice and
the CJIL staff for its helpful suggestions. This Development is dedicated to my grandfather, Dr.
Sanford Cohen, who taught me not to shy away from discussions of religion and politics.
I Samuel Huntington, The Clash of CiviliZations, 72(3) Foreign Aff 22, 25 (Summer 1993).
2 Qur'an 32.18. (Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an 10th US ed 1999) (M.H. Shakir, trans).
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secular in their statehood.3 Though the world is becoming more fragmented by
ideology, it is also better connected through technology, and it is the role of legal
scholars and policymakers to determine whether the maintenance of an
international collaborative government body really is feasible in all areas of law.
This Development explores the potential for compatibility between Islamic
Law and human rights-in particular the freedom of religion and belief. As
manifestations of Qur'anic law are as diverse as interpretations of '"Western"
liberal law, this Development focuses on Iranian Qur'anic law with only brief
mentions of the implications of Islamic law for other countries.4 Though the
Iranian interpretation of Islamic law is by no means representative of all Islamic
nations, because of its conservative nature, it can serve as a benchmark in the
analysis of other governmental systems.
Section I outlines the relevant international law, namely Article 18 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant"). It includes a
discussion of the UN's official interpretation of the Covenant and identifies
potential differences in interpretation of the Covenant by Muslim nations.
Section II outlines Iranian law, including a sketch of the pertinent portions of
the Iranian Constitution, its governmental interpretation, and the tools utilized
in this interpretation. Section III analyzes how the Iranian Constitution conflicts
with the Covenant. Section IV concludes by discussing the potential implications
of this conflict.
Ultimately this Development finds an inherent incompatibility between
Iranian Islamic Law and what might be called '"Western-based" international
law. Phrased differently, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, both
explicitly and as interpreted by the Iranian government, inherently violates the
UN's commitment to protect freedom of religion and belief, a commitment that
as a member state it has agreed to uphold. Unless the Islamic Republic of Iran
undergoes a regime change or a significant evolution of either theological or
political belief, it will be unable to comply with the Covenant and the subsequent
UN mandates requiring the modification of national policies. The specific
examples of Iran's violations that are explored in this Development are
symptomatic of its general administrative policy as opposed to freestanding
events or deviations from the norm. Therefore, the incompatibility between
3 Compare Sau Arab Const, art 1 with US Const, amend I.
4 For this reason, the conclusions of this Development cannot be generalized to other Islamic
countries without further research.
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 6 ILM 368 (1967) ("Covenant").
Note that Article 18 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights will be referred to as the
"Covenant." All other articles will be specifically referenced.
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Iranian law and UN human rights law is an issue that should particularly concern
the international community.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and
opened for signature, ratification, and accession in December 1966, was ratified
by Iran in June 1975, and entered into force in March 1976. As of January 2008,
it had been ratified by 161 nations.6 Though the government of Iran in power at
the time of the ratification was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution of 1979,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the signatory's successor state, has at no point
revoked its ratification of the treaty, nor has it made any official declarations or
reservations about any of its clauses. Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran remains
fully bound by the terms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
8
A. TEXT OF THE COVENANT
Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states
that each State party to it will respect and ensure the various rights in the
Covenant, through legislative and/or judicial means, to all individuals within its
territory without distinction of any kind "such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status."9 The particular right at issue in this Development is that of
freedom of religion and belief. Article 18 of the Covenant states that:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
(2) No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
6 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ("OHCHR), Status of
Ratification, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2008), available online at
<http://www2.ohchr.org/engish/bodies/ratification/4.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
7 OHCHR, Declarations and Reservations Made upon Ratification, Accession or Succession, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2008), available online at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/ratification/docs/DeclarationsReservationslCCPR.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (listing no
declarations or reservations made by Iran).
8 See Vienma Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978), 17 ILM 1488.
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), art 2, 6 ILM 368 (1967).
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(3) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others.
(4) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own
convictions. 10
In order to accommodate countries of different structural backgrounds, the
UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized that theocratic governments do
not automatically violate the Covenant as a result of promoting a particular state
religion." Even so, in its interpretation of the Covenant, the UN Human Rights
Committee has asserted that:
The fact that a religion is recognized as a State religion or that it is
established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the
majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the
enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including article[ ]
18..., nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or
non-believers.' 2
Thus, though a theocratic government does not automatically violate the
Covenant, it is subject to the same standards of conduct as countries with
secular governments.
The right to freedom of religion or belief, as defined by international
standards and articulated in instruments such as the Covenant, is broad and
covers a number of distinct but interrelated issues. 3 The United Nations' Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief ("Special Rapporteur") has
produced a series of documents in an attempt to clarify the categories under
which violations of the Covenant and other human rights instruments occur.'
4
Infractions of the Covenant fall primarily into the Special Rapporteur's first
category: Freedom of Religion and Belief. This is the only category that will be
explored in this Development. Within the Special Rapporteur's first category
there are a number of subcategories, the most relevant of which are the
Freedom to Adopt, Change, or Renounce a Religion or Belief; Freedom from
10 Covenant (cited in note 5).
" Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: The R'ght to Freedom of Thought, Consdence and
Religion (Art. 18), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 9 (1993).
12 Id.
13 OHCHR, Framework for Communications: Extracts from the Annual Reports 2006 and 2007 of the Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asmajahangir, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/5, 28-35 (2007),
available online at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religon/standards.htm> (visited Apr
5, 2008) ("FRAMEWORK").
14 Id. A discussion of the entire FRAMEWORK is outside the scope of this Development.
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Coercion; and The Right to Manifest One's Religion or Belief.' The application
of each of these subcategories to examples of actual violations is explored
below.
1. Freedom to Adopt, Change, or Renounce a Religion or Belief
The Covenant provides everyone "the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right... include[s] [the] freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice."' 6 In accordance with this clause, the
Special Rapporteur has asserted that she monitors the compliance of States in
such a way as
[t]o ensure that their constitutional and legislative systems provide adequate
and effective guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and
belief to all without distinction, inter alia by the provision of effective
remedies in cases where the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief, the right to practise freely one's religion, including the
right to change one's religion or belief, is violated.' 7
Thus, subcategory one protects individuals from violations of their rights
by the government and also requires a government to provide remedies when
violations occur. For example, the government of Afghanistan violated clause 1
of the Covenant when it charged Abdul Rahman with the capital crime of
conversion from Islam.'8 Thus, because clause 1 of the Covenant ensures
individuals the right to adopt a religion of their choice, a criminal penalty for the
adoption of a religion or conversion from a religion constitutes an example of a
breach of compliance.
2. Freedom from Coercion
Clause 2 of the Covenant proclaims that, "[n]o one shall be subject to
coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
of his choice."' 9 In accordance with this clause, the Special Rapporteur monitors
the compliance of States
'5 Id at 35.
16 Covenant at § 1 (cited in note 5).
17 OHCHR, Individual Complaints and Model Questionnaire of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, available online at <http://www2.ohchr.org/enghlsh/issues/religion/
complaints.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008) ("Individual Complaints and ModelQuestionnain).
18 In this case, Rahman had converted to Christianity sixteen years before the charges were brought.
Islamic views on conversion, otherwise known as apostasy, will be discussed in Section II. Human
Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled
'T-Iuman Rights Council", Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jabangir,
Addendum, Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received at 6, UN Doc
A/HRC/4/21/Add.1 (2007) ("Summary of Case?').
19 Covenant at § 2 (cited in note 5).
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to ensure that no one within their jurisdiction is deprived of the right to life,
liberty, or security of person because of religion or belief and that no one is
subjected to torture or arbitrary arrest or detention on that account, and to
bring to justice all perpetrators of violations of these rights.2°
Thus, subcategory two does not allow the state to coerce individuals into a
particular religion through the use of governmental instruments or deprivation
of bodily security. For example, the Special Rapporteur found that the Somali
government had violated the Covenant when it refused to respond to an
incident where Somali militiamen shot and killed two people at a screening of a
World Cup soccer broadcast. 21 The militiamen purportedly instigated the attacks
because the broadcast offended their interpretation of Islamic Law.22 Thus, even
the mere failure of the government to intervene in situations where citizens'
rights to bodily security are infringed upon by others constitutes a violation of
the Covenant.
3. The Right to Manifest One's Religion or Belief
Clause 1 of the Covenant protects "the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom .. .either individually
or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching., 23 Manifestation of religion
also includes "the right of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of
their children," a right enumerated, specifically, in clause 4 of the Covenant.
24
The Special Rapporteur monitors the compliance of states "to ensure . . . the
right of all persons to worship or assemble in connection with a religion or
belief.,
21
For example, the arrest and sentencing by Chinese officials of Ren Shujie
for practicing Falun Gong constitutes a violation of clause 1 of the Covenant,
under subsection three of Category 1 of the FRAMEWORK. Similarly, the
failure of the government of Georgia to intercede where state school children
were being baptized without parental permission is another a type of
impermissible conduct.26 Subcategory three is potentially the broadest, including
"all impediments, subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
20 Individual Complaints and ModelQuesionnaire (cited in note 17).
21 Summary of Cases at 66 (cited in note 18).
22 Id.
23 Covenant at § 1 (cited in note 5).
24 FRAMEWORK (cited in note 13). See also Covenant at § 4 (cited in note 5).
25 Individual Complaints and ModelQuestionnaire (cited in note 17).
26 Summagy of Cases at 23 (cited in note 18).
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fundamental rights and freedoms of others."27  In summary, the UN's
interpretation of the right to freedom of religion and belief is comprehensive.
B. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
ARTICULATED IN THE COVENANT
Though the UN's interpretation of the Covenant is binding, some of the
signatories of the Covenant articulate significantly different views of religious
freedom than those articulated in the Covenant itself. For example, Article 13 of
the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights defines the "Right to
Freedom of Religion" differently in its original Arabic version than in its
subsequent English translation.28
The official English translation states that "[e]very person has the right to
freedom of conscience and worship in accordance with his religious beliefs. 29
The differences between the right articulated in the English version of Article 13
and the right espoused by the Covenant are fairly subtle. This is not so with the
Arabic version. The Arabic version states that everyone has freedom of
conscience and worship according to the principle articulated in the Qur'anic
sura, al kafirun 109:6, that states, "you have your religion, I have mine."30 Though
facially this may appear analogous to the Covenant, it is important to note that
"al kafirun" can mean "unbelievers," "infidels," or "atheists," and has a decidedly
negative connotation.31
Though the sura does lay the groundwork for coexistence between
Muslims and nonbelievers, it does not provide the same level of protection for
non-Muslims as one finds in the Covenant. For example, because the right to
follow one's own beliefs in a Shari'ah system does not extend to Muslims
wishing to convert, such converts can be executed for apostasy.32 The Covenant
would surely not allow such a consequence for conversion. Thus, at the outset, it
is important to note that though the human rights declarations of Islamic
scholars may appear facially similar to the UN's interpretations of its human
rights treaties, there may, in reality, be significant differences in the
interpretations of such treaties by member states.
27 Covenant at § 3 (cited in note 5).
28 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Ri'ghts (1981), art 13, available online at
<http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
29 Id.
30 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights 179 (Westview 4th ed 2007).
31 Id.
32 Qur'an 9.12.
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II. IRANIAN LAW
This Section outlines the aspects of Iranian law that are relevant to a
discussion of freedom of religion and belief in Iran. It is the combination of
these aspects that makes violation of the Covenant virtually inevitable. First, this
Section presents the pertinent clauses of the Iranian Constitution. Second, it
examines alternative understandings of Shari'ah law as the basis for
Constitutional interpretation. Third, it illustrates that the structure of the Iranian
government is significant because it ensures a stability of ideology and
interpretation. Finally, it concludes that the Constitution is frequently interpreted
in ways that appear to violate the explicit text.
A. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
This Section describes the relevant portions of the Iranian Constitution
and examines them in the context of domestic policies and actions. It also
elucidates inconsistencies between the law as stated textually and the law as
applied and executed.
1. Article 2 and Article 4: Rationale for Islamic Government
Together, Articles 2 and 4 of the Constitution create the link between the
Iranian government and Islam. Article 2" of the Constitution sets out the
33 The Islamic Republic is a system based on belief in:
(1) The One God (as stated in the phrase "There is no god except Allah"), His
exclusive sovereignty and right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to
His commands;
(2) Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth the laws;
(3) The return to God in the Hereafter, and the constructive role of this belief
in the course of man's ascent towards God;
(4) The justice of God in creation and legislation;
(5) Continuous leadership (imarnah) and perpetual guidance, and its
fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of
Islam;
(6) The exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom coupled with
responsibility before God; in which equity, justice, political, economic, social,
and cultural independence, and national solidarity are secured by recourse to:
(a) continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha' possessing necessary
qualifications, exercised on the basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of
the Ma'sumun, upon all of whom be peace;
(b) sciences and arts and the most advanced results of human
experience, together with the effort to advance them further;
(c) negation of all forms of oppression, both the infliction of and the
submission to it, and of dominance, both its imposition and its
acceptance.
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rationale for the creation of a religious government, namely that God has
"exclusive sovereignty and right to legislate," that "divine revelation" has a
"fundamental role in setting forth the laws," and that "submission to [God's]
commands" is necessary.3 4 It emphasizes the importance of the Qur'an as the
word of God in the creation of legislation and in its interpretation. 35 As
previously mentioned in Section I.A.3, the existence of a religious government
does not automatically determine a country's actions toward or view of rights of
religious freedom. 36 A religious government can, however, make a country
susceptible to allegations of discrimination based on minority religious
viewpoints.
Article 2 also delineates the justifications for the Qur'anic deference
espoused by the Iranian government. 37 Because God has exclusive sovereignty
and the exclusive right to legislate, all human laws are subject to the regulations
that God presented in the Qur'an.38 Thus, it is only logical that the most
powerful and ultimately dominating branches of the Iranian government are
those which utilize the Qur'an as their fundamental guide.
Article 2 ensures that the religious positions and Qur'anic interpretations of
the prominent Iranian clerics remain the official legal positions of the Iranian
government in all aspects of its rule, including its treatment of religious
minorities. Because these clerics determine their own successors as well as those
who are eligible to fill the elected seats of government, their interpretation of
Shari'ah law will continue to be propagated and the governmental view is
unlikely to evolve significantly. As will become evident through discussion in
this Development, the prominent Iranian clerics hold a fundamentally
conservative view of the Qur'an and its mandates.
Like Article 2, Article 439 solidifies the religious views of the prominent
clerics into the ultimate religious and legal doctrine of the country, by requiring
that "[all] civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military,
political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria.
' 40
Iran Const, art 2, available online at <http://www.iranchamber.com/govemment/laws/
constitution.php> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
34 Id, art 2.
35 Id.
36 See Section I.A.3.
37 Iran Const, art 2.
38 Id.
39 "This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all
other laws and regulations, and thefuqaha' of the Guardian Council are judges in this matter." Id,
art 4.
40 Id.
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Article 4 further subordinates the legislative powers of the elected branches to
the power of the religiously oriented and appointed branches of the Iranian
government, namely the Council of Guardians. Functionally, Article 4 is an
extension and specification of the tenets presented in Article 2.
2. Article 12: Respect for Other Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence
Article 1241 accords "full respect" to the different schools of Islamic
jurisprudence and permits their followers "to act in accordance with their own
jurisprudence in performing their religious rites. 42 In particular, Article 12
provides full legal respect to Sunni Muslims even though the official state
religion is Shi'a Islam.43 In practice, however, Sunnis have not been afforded
these rights. Clerics appear to interpret this provision inconsistently, thus
allowing violations of both the Iranian Constitution and international law. This
inconsistent interpretation is illustrated more fully in Section III.B. Though it is
possible that these incidents simply reflect mistakes in the execution of
constitutional law, it will become evident throughout the remainder of this
Development that these "mistakes" are so prevalent and of such a nature that it
would be more accurate to characterize them as governmental interpretation.
41 Id, art 12.
The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school [in usual al-
Din and fiqh], and this principle will remain eternally immutable. Other
Islamic schools, including the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Zaydi, are to
be accorded full respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with
their own jurisprudence in performing their religious rites. These schools enjoy
official status in matters pertaining to religious education, affairs of personal
status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related litigation in courts
of law. In regions of the country where Muslims following any one of these
schools of fiqh constitute the majority, local regulations, within the bounds of
the jurisdiction of local councils, are to be in accordance with the respective
school of fiqh, without infringing upon the rights of the followers of other
schools.
42 There are four major Sunni schools (madb'hab): the Hanafi School, the Maliki School, the Shafi'i
School, and the Hanbali School. Though the main Shi'a School is the Twelver Ja'fari School,
other schools such as the Zaydi School also exist. These schools represent different
interpretations of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. See Sayyid Moustafa Qazwini, Inquiries about Shi'a
Islam, ch 3 (Islamic Education Center of Orange County), available online at <http://www.al-
islam.org/shiism/3.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
43 The Sunni/Shi'a split originally centered on the question of who was to become leader of the
Islamic community after the death of Mohammed. Based on this initial division, the two schools
have developed somewhat different views about spiritual life and the requisite rituals.
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3. Article 13: Rights Afforded to Protected People
Article 1344 recognizes Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians as the only legally
"recognized religious minorities" and the only religious minorities who "are free
to perform their religious rites and ceremonies," "within the limits of the law."
The text of Article 13 is significant for two reasons. First, it specifies that
Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are the only protected people. Accordingly,
people from other religions, for example, Hindus, Buddhists, and Baha'is, are
not protected. They are not "free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies,
and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and
religious education., 45 The Iranian government says as much with regard to the
Baha'is in its 2006 response to a discrimination concern voiced by the Special
Rapporteur, asserting that there are many "official religions" in Iran, but that
Baha'ism is not one of them and is thus relegated to a lower governmental
status.46
Second, though Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians are legally recognized,
Article 13 only protects them "within the limits of the law," an articulation of
the premise that freedom of religion for even the protected people can be
restricted. 47 Tellingly, despite these nominal constitutional protections for Jews,
Christians, and Zoroastrians, these groups consistently endure violations of the
rights they were promised. For example, in the early months after the 1979
Revolution, many Christian churches were closed, congregational lands were
seized, and attacks were made against the clergy.48
4. Article 14: Human Rights of Non-Muslims
Article 1449 purportedly protects the human rights of non-Muslims who do
not engage in "conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of
4 "Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities, who,
within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act
according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education." Iran Const,
art 13.
45 Id. See Human Rights Watch, Iran: Religious and Ethnic Minorities: Discrimination in Law and Practice,
available online at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/iran/Iran-05.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
46 See Sumna y of Cases at 45 (cited in note 18).
47 Iran Const, art 13.
48 Human Rights Watch, Iran: Religious and Ethnic Minorities (cited in note 45). In addition, though
religious minorities are allowed to vote in national elections, they are not allowed to run for
President. This could be viewed as the type of coercion which might impair an individual's
freedom to have or to adopt a religion of his choice that is explicitly banned by the Covenant.
49 Iran Const, art 14.
In accordance with the sacred verse; ("God does not forbid you to deal kindly
and justly with those who have not fought against you because of your religion
and who have not expelled you from your homes" [60:8]), the government of
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Iran." It says that non-Muslims are entitled to be treated in conformity with the
principles of Islamic justice. As previously mentioned in Section I.B., human
rights in the Qur'an are not necessarily synonymous with human rights as
articulated by Western philosophers and ultimately international treaties. The
range of rights recognized by the Qur'an is narrower than those typically
espoused by international law. Thus the same concerns that were present with
Article 13 are also present with Article 14. An Islamic society potentially
supports the coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims but does not purport to
provide true equality of status rights to the two groups.5"
5. Article 23: Prohibition of Investigation of Beliefs and Harassment
Based on Beliefs
Article 2351 professes to protect the rights to freedom of religion and belief
by forbidding "the investigation of individuals' beliefs" and by prohibiting
molestation based on these beliefs.52 Although Article 23 shares many similarities
with other Articles, there are two additional issues at play here. First, only
Muslims are permitted to run for President.53 This seems counterintuitive given
the text of Article 23, as it would seem to be impossible to know whether a
candidate was Muslim without investigating his beliefs. Second, the fact that the
Council of Guardians can disqualify candidates for office based on their beliefs
also conflicts with Article 23." Thus, the government is either ignoring the text
of its Constitution, or, not interpreting Article 23 in a literal way.
If we assume that Article 23 is meaningful, it has still been violated by the
Iranian government. For example, according to the Special Rapporteur's
Summary of Cases, "in September 2005, a religious jurist in Qom called for a
the Islamic Republic of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-
Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice
and equity, and to respect their human rights. This principle applies to all who
refrain from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
50 See Qur'an 2.62. Compare id at 2.221 (explaining that marrying a believer from a lower social class
is preferable to marrying an idolatress from the same social class).
51 "The investigation of individuals' beliefs is forbidden, and no one may be molested or taken to
task simply for holding a certain belief." Iran Const, art 23.
52 Id.
53 See id, art 115. Though Article 115 does not explicitly mention the word Muslim, it does require
"convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official
religion of the country," a requirement that is functionally the same.
54 See id, art 99; see also BBC News, In Depth: Iran, Who Holds the Power (2003), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /shared/spl/hi/rmiddle-east/03/iranpower/html/guardian-
council.stm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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crackdown on Sufi groups in Qom. Some people were reportedly required to
sign documents renouncing Sufism. '5' This is a violation of Article 23.
B. A BRIEF FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
IRANIAN CONSTITUTION: SHARI'AH
1. Shari'ah
Shari'ah law is the legal manifestation of Islam, as reported by the Qur'an
and the Qur'anic interpretation present in the Hadith.56 Islam is unique in the
fact that the religion itself sets out a legal system as opposed to just a religious
system. Thus, discussion of Shari'ah law will be fundamentally religious in
nature.
Qur'anic verse 2.256 states that, "[t]here is no compulsion in religion; truly
the right way has become clearly distinct from error." This being said, Shari'ah
law, through its creation of a covenant with other people of the book, does
promote a hierarchy within society that is based on religious belief.57 Muslims
appear at the top and the nonbelievers at the bottom, as is evidenced by the
common theme in both the Qur'an and the Hadith that striving against
nonbelievers and defeating them is of utmost importance.58 Jews, Christians, and
Zoroastrians (in Iran) fall between the believers and the nonbelievers, as they are
"people of the book" or dhimmi and thus believe in the one true God. Though
they call Allah by a different name, they, like Muslims, have been deemed
worthy enough to receive revelation, and thus fall into a protected category
within Shari'ah law. Within Muslim society, they are theoretically ensured certain
rights including "security of person and property, freedom of worship, and a
degree of communal autonomy. ' 59 Textually (and, for the most part, historically)
nonbelievers have not been afforded these rights. Despite the fact that dhimmi
are granted certain rights, their citizenship in Muslim society also has limitations.
They are subject to a poll tax;6" they are not allowed to preach their religions
55 Summary of Cases at 46 (cited in note 16).
56 The Hadith are also considered religiously binding but are below the Qur'an in the religious
hierarchy. Because the Hadith were not written by Mohammad himself, there is a significant body
of historical Islamic jurisprudence determining which of the Hadith are reliable and thus should be
followed.
57 See Sahib Bukhari, Book 23: Funerals (A1-Janaa'iz) vol 2, book 23, num 475 (M. Muhsin Khan,
trans), available online at <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/
bukhari/023.sbt.html> (visited Feb 28, 2008) (stating that Mohammed recommends that Muslims
abide by the rules and contracts set out for the dhimmi).
58 See, for example, Qur'an 9.73, 9.123.
59 Katerina Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights 46 (.B. Tauris 1998).
60 This tax is collected in place of the Zakat, the Islamic tax used to support the poor.
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openly; and they are forbidden from holding high political offices.6 Thus,
though the dbimmi should enjoy religious tolerance, the Qur'an does not
necessarily guarantee them equality or freedom of religion as described in the
West.
It is also important to note that within Shari'ah law apostasy is considered
a double crime, against both God and political authority, and punishment is the
death penalty.6 2 Juristic interpretations of the requisite penalty for apostasy have
varied throughout the course of history, though, with progressive Islamic
scholars denying the necessity of a death sentence. Similarly, debates over the
consistency between a death sentence for apostasy and the rule against
compulsion in religion, with its multiple interpretations, are far from resolved.63
Thus, progressives continue to emphasize the penalty's invalidity, while leaders
and theorists associated with resurgences of textualism and conservatism elevate
the penalty to a status like that of civil law.
Finally,jihad is an important part of the Qur'an and, thus, also a crucial part
of Shari'ah law. Though only the final stage of a jibad is violent, its entire
premise rests on the fact that Islam is the one true way.64 For example, the
Qur'an states, "0 Prophet! strive hard against the unbelievers and the
hypocrites, and be hard against them; and their abode is hell; and evil is the
resort."65 The Qur'an also states,
0 you who believe! do not take My enemy and your enemy for friends:
would you offer them love while they deny what has come to you of the
truth, driving out the Apostle and yourselves because you believe in Allah,
your Lord? If you go forth struggling hard in My path and seeking My
pleasure, would you manifest love to them? And I know what you conceal
and what you manifest; and whoever of you does this, he indeed has gone
astray from the straight path.66
These passages elucidate a potential difficulty faced by Islamic states in
how to reconcile the promotion of the one true way with the protection of the
rights of those who have chosen different religious paths. In practice, however,
as evidenced by this Development, rights that contradict the Qur'an may simply
be overlooked.
61 Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights at 46 (cited in note 59).
62 Id at 47.
63 For a discussion of the different viewpoints see Mayer, Islam and Human Rigbts at 167-68 (cited in
note 30).
64 For more information on Shari'ah law, see generally Hunt Janin and Andr6 Kahlmeyer, Islamic
Law: The Sharia from Muhammad's Time to the Present (McFarland 2007).
65 Qur'an 66.9.
66 Id at 60.1.
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2. Qur'anic Interpretation: The Many Faces of Shari'ah
There are two general Muslim perspectives regarding Islam, and the Qur'an
in particular. The first, as explained by Katerina Dalacoura, views Islam as a
sacred, unchanging, predominantly literal, "eternally determined body of rules."67
It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this perspective with
modern international human rights.68  Iranian clerics have adopted this
conservative view of Islam.69 The second perspective, one that can be
compatible with modern international human rights, views Islam as capable of
change, development, and transformation over time, as long as the underlying
spirit of the religion is maintained.7 ° Dalacoura, in Islam, Liberalism and Human
Rights, writes,
If the literal word of the Koran and the traditional sharia are accepted as
prescriptive, there is no room for conciliation. Similarly, if society at the
time of the Prophet is posited as the ideal, the outcome is sterility in liberal
thought, even if that ideal is described as democratic. 71
This difference in Qur'anic interpretation turns partially on whether the gates of
itjihad, the process of applying reason when interpreting the Qur'an, have been
closed, meaning that there is no further room to interpret the Qur'an and the
Hadith. An open gate of itjihad, which allows current Islamic scholars to provide
new Qur'anic interpretation, is necessary but not sufficient for a reading of Islam
that is compatible with international notions of human rights.72
Dalacoura also writes that for an Islamic worldview to be compatible with
international human rights, it must view the law, even Shari'ah law, as having the
purpose of serving humankind, thus maintaining a level of flexibility to adapt to
changing circumstances. 73 This is distinct from the conservative view that the
purpose of law is solely to "serve God.,, 74 Again, however, an emphasis on
serving the public is necessary but not sufficient for the requisite compatibility to
occur. 7 Dalacoura summarizes her systemic analysis: "If the law is seen as an
immutable divine imperative-serving God, not man, and coming from God
directly, without human intervention-the law becomes intolerant, whatever its
particular rules, partly because those who execute the law cannot be held
67 Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights at 63 (cited in note 59).
68 Id.
69 See generally Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (Mitzan 1981) (Hamid Algar, trans).
70 Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights at 63 (cited in note 59).
71 Id.
72 Id at 64.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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accountable." She concludes that this is what happened in Iran after 1979, the
year of Iran's Islamic Revolution 76 when the secular government of the Shah
was overthrown in favor of an Islamic Republic.
The Iranian clerics in power in the Islamic Republic of Iran believe that
Law is an "immutable divine imperative" and though it serves man, its primary
purpose is to serve God. This is not so with all Islamic thinkers. The Sudanese
Ustaz, Mahmud Muhammad Taha, for example, suggested that "the Koran was
revealed in two stages, the first, in Mecca, dealing with general moral and
religious principles and the second, in Medina, being more specific and legalistic
because it was responding to a concrete situation."77 Taha and his followers
believed that only the revelation of general moral and religious principles is
eternally authoritative, whereas the specific legalistic tenets of the Medina
revelation are limited to that time period alone. 8 Under such a view, the specific
legal tenets could be reformed as the particular needs of society change.
79
C. INTERPRETERS OF THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION:
DEMOCRATS OR PHILOSOPHER-KINGS?
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran sets out the governmental
structure through which power flows. The structure of the government is
significant because power is concentrated in the Supreme Leader and the
Council of Guardians ("Council"), positions that are unelected and, perhaps
more importantly, religiously oriented. The Supreme Leader chooses the voting
members of the Council. The Council then determines who can run for the
other political offices and whether laws passed by these elected political officials
violate the Constitution and ultimately the Qur'an.8° Even if popular Iranian
opinion regarding the role of religion in daily life were to change, a subsequent
76 Id.
77 Id at 61.
78 See Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, The Second Message of Islam 124-64 (Syracuse 1987) (Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na'im, trans).
79 See id at 130. For example, Taha, using this methodology, stated that polygamy is no longer
acceptable. The general moral principle revealed in the first stage was that "marriage is between
one man and one woman." Before the revelation of the Qur'an a man could take as many wives
as he wanted, and historically, in times of scarcity, these wives would suffer and, in many cases
die. Thus the Qur'anic limitation of four wives was actually a step forward for women, moving
them toward the ultimate goal of better treatment in marriage. This example is significant because
it illustrates how an adherence to the Qur'an does not have to prohibit the development of a
modern legal system compatible with international legal norms. Other reformers have taken
slightly different approaches, but the consequences have been the same: a flexible view of the
Qur'an and ultimately the role and prescriptions of Shari'ah law allow modem Islamic law to be
compatible with international human rights treaties. See id at 140-41.
s0 For more detail about the structure of the Iranian government, see note 81.
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modification in the Iranian jurisprudence and lawmaking would not necessarily
follow, and at the very least, could be significantly delayed. This is true because
the Supreme Leader has the power to create and to control the Council, and the
Council has a dominant relationship with the other branches of the government,
thus ensuring a continuity of ideas, regardless of public opinion. Thus, the
interpretations of Shari'ah law, the Iranian Constitution, and the relationship
between them are fairly immutable and will be treated as such throughout the
remainder of this Development.81 The Supreme Leader's understanding of the
Constitution and the Qur'an and the relationship between them thus constitute
what amounts, in all practicality, to binding Constitutional interpretation.
The original Supreme Leader was Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the
Iranian Revolution. The current and only other Supreme Leader is Ayatollah
Khamenei, who was personally chosen by, and succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini
after his death.82 Khomeini espoused a traditionalist, literalist view of Islam in his
writings and speeches based on the Qur'an. This Qur'anic view, in turn, is the
basis of the "legitimate" interpretation of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Article 4 of the Constitution asserts that "all articles of the
Constitution, as well as ... all other laws" must be based upon Islamic criteria.83
Because the official government stance regarding Qur'anic interpretation is
conservative and textualist, all modern rights are subject to the actual textual
limitations and specifications within the Qur'an and the historical interpretations
81 At the top of Iran's power structure is the Supreme Leader, who sets the tone and direction of
Iran's domestic and foreign policy. He has the power to appoint and to dismiss, among others,
the leaders of the judiciary, and six of the twelve members of the Council of Guardians. The
Council of Guardians interprets the Constitution and determines whether the laws passed by
parliament are in line with Shari'ah. It has veto power over Parliament, and at times has vetoed up
to 40 percent of the laws passed by Parliament. The Council also has the power to determine the
fitness of candidates for the popularly elected positions. The remaining six jurists on the Council
of Guardians are recommended by the Judiciary and appointed by Parliament. In the 2001
Presidential election, only 10 out of 270 candidates were approved by the Council and made the
ballot. Thus, in conjunction with the Supreme Leader, the Council holds a significant amount of
power.
The President, elected by popular vote, is technically the second highest ranking officer of the
Iranian government, but shares his control of many government agencies with the Supreme
Leader. The parliament, also popularly elected, drafts legislation, ratifies treaties, and approves the
budget, subject to the approval of the Council of Guardians.
The Assembly of Experts is a group of eighty-six "virtuous and learned" clerics popularly elected
for eight-year terms. They meet once a year and elect the Supreme Leader from within their ranks.
They also periodically reconfirm him. Historically, the Assembly has never challenged a Supreme
Leader's decision. See Iran Chamber Society, The Structure of Power in Iran, available online at
<http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure-ofpower.php> (visited Apr 5,
2008).
82 See id.
83 Iran Const, art 4.
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of Qur'anic statements found in the Hadith. As was previously mentioned, a
literal interpretation of the Qur'an puts it at odds with "Western" views on
freedom of religion and belief.
Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution and first Supreme
Leader, asserted that "[w]hat they call human rights is nothing but a collection of
corrupt rules worked out by Zionists to destroy all true religions. 84 Similarly, Ali
Khamenei, then president of Iran and successor-in-waiting to Khomeini as
Supreme Leader, stated, "[w]hen we want to find out what is right and what is
wrong, we do not go to the United Nations; we go to the Holy Koran.... For
us the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is nothing but a collection of
mumbo-jumbo by disciples of Satan."8
Ayatollah Khomeini's statement in the previous paragraph is particularly
illuminating because of its focus on human rights as the attempted destruction
of all true religions, namely Islam. As illustrated by his commitment to a
religious conservative ideology, one can surmise that a liberalization of the views
on freedom of religion, belief, and expression, and a lifting of the ban on
apostasy, would fall into the category of attempted destruction of Islam. In some
of his political speeches, Khomeini did praise a concept of society where there
will be no difference between religious minorities and Muslims in the
implementation of justice.86 In the vast majority of his writings and speeches,
however, Khomeini did not refer to these religious minorities in a
complimentary way. For example, in his Program for the Establishment of an Islamic
Government, Khomeini wrote,
In our own city of Tehran now there are centers of evil propaganda run by
the churches, the Zionists, and the Baha'is in order to lead our people astray
and make them abandon the ordinances and teachings of Islam. Do we not
have a duty to destroy these centers that are damaging to Islam?87
In his Message to the People of Azerbayjan he declared, "The religious leaders will
hoist the banner of Islam to exact vengeance on this Zuhhak88 of the age, and
the nation of Islam, with their hearts in unison and obeying the life-giving
teachings of the Qur'an will expunge every trace of this anti-Islamic regime that
wishes to revive Zoroastrianism. ' '89 Khomeini's views toward people of other
84 Edward Mortimer, Islam and Human Rights, 12 Index on Censorship 5, 5 (1983).
85 Id.
86 See, for example, Khomeini, Islam and Revolution at 266 (cited in note 69).
87 Id at 128.
88 This is a comparison to a villainous king in pre-Islamic Iran who was defeated by the Muslims, in
the same way that Khomeini is planning to defeat the villainous in modern times.
89 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution at 230 (cited in note 69). The conciliatory nature of this speech is
most likely due to the fact that it was made before the revolution, and Khomeini was in the
process of gaining power.
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religions and their role in society were further elucidated in his pre-revolution
declaration, In Commemoration of the Martyrs at Qum. In this speech, Khomeini
clearly abhorred the fact that Jews and Christians were allowed to be judges and
"to decide on affairs concerning the honor and person of the Muslims."9 These
statements exemplify Khomeini's views toward religious minorities and their
proper role in an Islamic society: they are not equal and they should not receive
equal opportunities.
Khomeini's actions as Supreme Leader of Iran support this view. For
example, on February 14, 1989, Khomeini issued a death edict for blasphemy for
Indian-born, British-citizen, Sunni-Muslim Salman Rushdie, claiming that his
novel, The Satanic Verses, was an attack on "Islam, the Qu'ran, and the
Prophet."91 Though the Iranian clerics had not even read the book, which was
published in English, Khomeini added to the death sentence that Rushdie must
be executed even if he repented. On June 3, 1989, Khomeini died, making the
fatwa (in this case a death sentence) permanent.9 2 The post-Khomeini
government maintained that thefatwa cannot be reversed and only in 1998 did it
promise to dissociate itself from it.
93
Despite the fact that the government dissociated itself from the death
sentence, a move that appeared to signify an evolution in the governmental
views surrounding blasphemy, it continued to act in conformity with its pre-
dissociation views. Hashem Aghajari, an Iranian academic, was sentenced to
death in 2002 for blasphemy after he gave a speech that questioned the power of
the clerics and mainstream emulation of their behavior.94 Though the Iranian
Supreme Court quashed the death sentence in 2003 for procedural failings, the
case was sent back to the very same court that had issued it.95 Thus, it is
apparent that the government's position regarding public speech antithetical to
its Qur'anic beliefs has not significantly changed between 1989 and 2002. This is
not unexpected. As described above, the structure of the government ensures
that people with the same viewpoints will remain in power.
90 Id at 175.
91 Mayer, Islam and Human Rights at 183 (cited in note 30).
92 For more information on fatwas, see Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S.
Powers, eds, Islamic Legal Intepretation, Muftis and their Fatwas (Oxford 2005).
93 Mayer, Islam and Human Rights at 184 (cited in note 30). See also Iran Focus, Iran Says Rushdie
Fatwa Still Stands (Feb 14, 2006), available online at <http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/
artidcle.php?storyid=5768> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
94 BBC News, Profile: Hashem Aghajai (July 9, 2003), available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle-east/3053075.stm> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
95 Id.
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III. THE SHATTERED MIRAGE: INHERENT CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COVENANT
The situation in Iran is one in which the actions of the government
illustrate the interpreted meanings of the Constitution and the government's
commitment to the premises therein. At first glance, it appears that it would be
possible for the international community to command Iran to conform its
behavior to international law. This is not possible, however, without a complete
overhaul of the Iranian government because of Iran's understanding of the
Qur'an and its role in the Iranian Constitution.
As long as the human rights articulated in the Iranian Constitution are
subject to literal and historically based analyses of the Qur'an, the Iranian
government will be unable to comply with the Covenant. The structure of the
Iranian government ensures that its traditionalist view of the Qur'an, espoused
by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers at the time of the Revolution, will
continue to be the dominant religious view among the people in power. Thus, as
long as the Iranian government remains structured in this way, allowing little
flow of progressive theological ideas, its interpretation of the very Constitution
which defines its power will violate the Covenant. In some cases, the actions of
the government seem to even violate the majoritarian Qur'anic view which has,
at least, nominal human rights protections. In other places, the traditional
Qur'anic view itself is at odds with human rights. Section III.A explores textual
violations and Section III.B examines interpretive violations of the Covenant.
A. DIRECT TEXTUAL VIOLATIONS OF THE COVENANT
1. Freedom to Adopt, Change, or Renounce a Religion
Under the Covenant, the freedom to adopt, to change, or to renounce a
religion is absolute.96 Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution's limitation on
protected religions explicitly violates the Covenant's absolute protection of this
freedom.9" It may appear that such a violation of the Covenant could be
remedied by removal of the word "only" from Article 13 of the Constitution.
This Development illustrates that an examination of the relationship between
the Qur'an and the Constitution reveals that such a simple solution is not
possible. The belief in only a small, limited group of protected non-Muslims is
religiously significant, and thus a fundamental part of the Iranian system.
96 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 at 3 (cited in note 11).
97 See Covenant (cited in note 5).
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2. Limitations on Freedom of Belief versus Limitations on
Manifestations of Belief
The Covenant protects freedom of belief absolutely, meaning that there is
no acceptable governmental rationale for restricting it. The right to manifest
one's religion or belief is subject only to "such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others."
98
Putting aside the aforementioned violation inherent in the constitutional
restriction of freedom of worship to dhimmi, it is likely that the even the
freedoms afforded to these "protected peoples" would not be sufficient to allow
conformity with the Covenant. Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution states that
dhimmi are allowed "within the limits of the law" to manifest their beliefs in the
form of worship and education that they prefer.99 Though Article 13 does have
one of the prongs of the Covenant's permitted limitation on the right to
manifestation of religion, the requirement that the limitation be codified in law,
it does not have the second, the requirement that the limitation be "necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others."100
Thus, it seems that the Iranian government could pass a law limiting, for
example, Jewish schools. Such a law would pass constitutional muster, but
would ultimately violate the Covenant. It could be argued that such a law might
fall under the protection of morality, an area protected by the Covenant, if
morality in Iran is religiously defined. Such an interpretation of the Covenant,
however, seems problematic. If read in this way, the Article would essentially
ensure an individual's right to freedom of belief and the manifestations of that
belief unless his government, a theocratic government promoting a different
religion, passed a law that prohibited the practice of the individual's religion
because it was contrary to and thus immoral according to the religion promoted
by the government. The government in such a situation could simply argue that
any religion that is different from the state religion is immoral. Thus, under such
a reading, the Covenant provides virtually no protection at all for freedom of
religion. The Human Rights Committee has ruled that the use of the morality
exception for discriminatory purposes against a particular religion is invalid
under the Covenant.01 Therefore, an appeal to the morality clause in this case
would not be justifiable.
98 Id at § 3.
99 Iran Const, art 13.
100 Covenant at § 3 (cited in note 5).
101 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 at 8 (cited in note 11).
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Accordingly, the text of Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution appears to
violate the Covenant in a number of ways. First, it only extends purported
religious freedom to Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, thus implicitly denying
this freedom to people of other religions and beliefs. Second, it provides these
protected people the freedom to manifest their religion subject to the limits
propounded by law. As Iranian law is significantly intertwined with its
interpretation of the Qur'an, "the law" could refer to either secular peacekeeping
regulations or religious moral mandates. Similarly, the fact that Article 13 of the
Iranian Constitution only includes one part of the Covenant's two-part limitation
does not, absent evidence that the Iranian government is using this limitation for
purposes deemed illegitimate by the Covenant, require that the Article is
inconsistent with the Covenant. In both scenarios, a thorough analysis of the
interpretation and application of the second portion of Article 13 is required to
determine its actual compatibility with the Covenant.
B. VIOLATIONS IN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
No government perfectly executes its law. There are mistakes made by
individuals and bureaucracies that sometimes tend to undermine the very
purposes of the constitutional provisions or legislation which they are bound to
protect. That being said, sometimes actions that appear to be facially
inconsistent with legislative and constitutional texts, in fact, elucidate the true
meaning of the texts to both those who created them and those who execute
them.
The Iranian government's constitutional interpretation remains fairly stable
as a result of the structure of the Iranian government and the distribution of
power.0 2 Thus, discerning the government's interpretation of its own
Constitution allows researchers to determine with reasonable accuracy the
fundamental Iranian legal understanding of and commitment to the rights
enumerated in the Covenant. Though an adherence to Qur'anic law over
international law does not necessarily mean that Iran could not comply with
international law, it calls into question the view that the Iranian Constitution
puts forth the same rights as those outlined in the Covenant. It is unlikely that a
government that believes that the rights articulated in International Treaties is
the "mumbo-jumbo" of "the disciples of Satan" has created a domestic
constitution promoting that "mumbo-jumbo" as the law of the land.'0 3 The
Iranian government is not, however, ill-versed in foreign affairs and assuredly
understands that to be an accepted political and economic member of the
102 See Section II.C.
103 See id.
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international community it must be a member of the UN and that to gain
international approval it must maintain its ratification of the Covenant. In all
practicality, however, this does not mean that the Iranian government supports
these ideals or ultimately intends to comply with them.
The Iranian government's lack of support for the rights articulated in the
Covenant is evident from its inconsistent application of the clauses in the
Iranian Constitution. As was illustrated in Section II.A, the Iranian government
has blatantly and consistently violated Articles 12, 13, 14, and 23 of its
Constitution. °4 Such a massive scale of transgression is unlikely to result from
mere misfeasance on the part of individual government agents. It is significantly
more likely to result from an underlying government strategy. In this case, the
government strategy regards both the necessity of membership in the
international legal community and includes inherent animosity toward the
"Western" version of freedom of religion.0 5 Thus, the number and scope of
these violations represents an inherent interpretive incompatibility between the
Constitution and the Covenant. In short, the Iranian implementation of Iranian
law through its Constitution and its power structure cannot protect the
international legal rights of freedom of religion and belief as articulated by the
Covenant.
1. Freedom to Adopt, Change, or Renounce a Religion or Belief
Clause 1 of the Covenant asserts the freedom to adopt, change or
renounce a religion or belief.106 Section II.A.3 illustrated that the Iranian
Constitution's limitation of religious freedom to only Jews, Christians, and
Zoroastrians automatically violates the Covenant because it does not provide
freedom of religion to all religious groups. Its application to these groups also
violates the Covenant because it restricts the rights of individuals to convert
from Islam to other religions, including the protected ones. For example, the
criminal punishment for apostasy, and its subsequent limitation on belief is an
element of the Shari'ah law adopted by Iran. For example, in December 1993,
Reverend Mehdi Dibaj was sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court for
apostasy and insulting Islam.07 He had converted from Islam to Christianity
forty-five years earlier. The criminalization of renouncing a religion, even if
based in religious exegesis as opposed to codified law, blatantly violates clause 1
of the Covenant. It is, however, an important aspect of conservative Islam.
Thus, it is apparent that freedom of belief is subject to Qur'anic limitations,
104 See Section II.A.
105 See generally Section II.C.
106 Covenant at § 1 (cited in note 5).
107 Human Rights Watch, Iran: Relgious and Ethnic Minorities (cited in note 45).
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limitations that, when read literally, conflict in a number of areas with the
Covenant.
2. Freedom from Coercion
Clause 2 of the Covenant states, "[n]o one shall be subject to coercion
which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice."' 8 The Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has asserted
that coercion includes "the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to
compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and
congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert."'0 9 Similarly, the
Committee has stated that "policies or practices having the same intention or
effect" constitute coercion."0 Examples include the restriction of access to
education, medical care, or employment because of religious beliefs."'
The Iranian government regularly engages in coercive behavior in spite of
its Constitution because it systematically violates Article 23, which forbids the
investigation of individuals' beliefs.' 2 As discussed in Section II.C, it investigates
the religious beliefs of both people hoping to become members of the
government and requiring ordinary citizens to sign documents stating and
renouncing their religion.
Finally, the Iranian government provides a number of privileges to Shi'a
Muslims that it does not provide to other groups. For example, Shi'a seminary
students are exempt from military service whereas Sunni seminary students are
not."' This discriminatory granting of privileges is coercive by nature. Thus, the
Iranian government is willing to manipulate the meaning of the Constitution and
its purported prohibitions to achieve its religious goals, regardless of the
coerciveness of the techniques utilized.
3. The Right to Manifest One's Religion or Belief
Clause 1 of the Covenant includes the freedom to manifest one's religion
or belief "in worship, observance, practice and teaching.""' 4 This is limited only
by "limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
108 Covenant (cited in note 5).
109 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 at 5 (cited in note 11).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 See Iran Const, art 23.
113 Human Rights Watch, Iran: Relgous and Ethnic Minotifies (cited in note 45).
114 Covenant (cited in note 5).
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others.'15 The Iranian government views this limitation on the freedom to
manifest one's religion very broadly, thereby putting the Constitution and its
application in conflict with the Covenant.
For example, though Article 13 of the Constitution maintains that
protected peoples have the freedom to manifest their religious beliefs subject
only to limitations of law, the limitation frequently engulfs the freedom. Despite
supposed freedom of worship, in the early months after the Revolution, many
Christian churches were closed, congregational lands were seized, and attacks
were made against the clergy." 6 The Covenant protects the right to manifest
one's religion "individually or in community with others and in public or
private.""' 7  The removal of such structural mechanisms for "worship,
observance, practice and teaching" constitutes an undue restriction on the ability
of minority religious groups to manifest their religion as they see fit.
Similarly, though Article 12 of the Constitution purportedly provides,
without exception, equal rights of religious practice to members of minority
schools of Islamic jurisprudence, these rights are not infrequently violated in
practice. For example, Shi'a prayer leaders are carrying out religious rites in
accordance with Shi'a traditions despite the fact that they are serving Sunni
congregations." 8 Likewise, when a Sunni mosque was destroyed by Shi'a
radicals, authorities took no action to restrain or punish the perpetrators." 9 In
1994 when the Sunni community of Sanandaj raised sufficient funds and
obtained all the necessary building permits from local officials to enlarge their
mosque, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance blocked the enlargement and
confiscated the funds. 2°
Thus, the Iranian government unduly burdens the freedom of individuals
to manifest their religion. Though exceptions may exist in individual situations
to protect the religious rights of others or to maintain public safety, the
overwhelming majority of violations of the Covenant cannot be justified on such
grounds. Therefore, the limitation presented in the Iranian Constitution on the
right to manifest one's religion is significantly broader and thus inherently
incompatible with the limitation espoused by the Covenant.
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4. The Cross-Categorical Issues Concerning Article 14 of the Iranian
Constitution
Article 14 purportedly protects the human rights of non-Muslims who do
not engage in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of
Iran. It says that non-Muslims are entitled to be treated in conformity with the
principles of Islamic justice. As mentioned in Section II of this Development,
human rights in the Qur'an are not necessarily synonymous with human rights
as articulated by Western philosophers and ultimately international treaties. An
Islamic society potentially supports the coexistence of Muslims and non-
Muslims but does not purport to provide true equality of status rights to the two
gUS121
groups. 12
Another issue with Article 14 is its susceptibility to being utilized in such a
way as to undermine the exact rights which it is supposed to protect. When
"insulting Islam" is a crime, it is fairly easy to target entire religious groups for
their beliefs or practices and accuse them of conspiring against Islam. This is
best demonstrated by examining a concrete example. On January 15, 2006, three
members of the Baha'i community were arrested and one of them was told that
he attracted "non-Baha'i to the Baha'i faith." His crime was reduced from
apostasy, a crime punishable by death, to involvement in Baha'i activities and
insulting Islam. Another detainee was told that she was charged with "teaching
the Baha'ism sect and acting in an insulting manner towards all that is holy in
Islam.' 1
22
In addition, on May 19, 2006, fifty-four Baha'is were arrested in Shiraz
while involved in local community work with a local nongovernmental
organization.123 Many were released after their homes and belongings had been
searched and after they agreed to appear in court if summoned.12 4
Another issue involves the potential monitoring of Baha'i communities.
The Special Rapporteur was concerned by this program as put in place by the
Iranian government. 125 As of March 8, 2007, the Iranian government had not
responded to the Special Rapporteur's questions regarding the second issue and
had responded that the first set of incidents was necessary because of an alleged
conspiracy by the individuals charged against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Though the Iranian government denies that the arrests were made on the basis
of religion, and, in fact claims that the majority of the sixty-one people arrested
121 See Mayer, Islam and Human Rights 151-52 (cited in note 30).
122 Id.
123 Summary of Cases at 48 (cited in note 18).
124 Id.
125 Id at 44.
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were not Baha'i, the numbers of the Special Rapporteur seem to speak
differently. 126 Thus, Article 14 may not provide much real protection for
unprotected religious minorities at all.
IV. AN UNSETTLING CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE
GO FROM HERE?
This Development concludes that unless the Islamic Republic of Iran
undergoes a regime change or a significant evolution of either theological or
political belief, it will be unable to comply with the Covenant and the subsequent
UN mandates requiring the modification of national policies. This should be
disturbing for the international community as a whole. What is the United
Nations to do when, because of systemic and ideological inherencies, a country
cannot be brought into compliance with the Covenant save an overthrow of its
government or a revolution in its "religio-moral" consciousness? Traditional UN
sanctions are unlikely to be effective because the penalties will purport to punish
specific incidents, incidents that in the case of Iran are symptomatic of its
general administrative policy as opposed to freestanding events. Also, those in
power are not likely to choose to facilitate the ultimate demise of their authority
by admitting systemic flaws for the sole purpose of avoiding punitive measures
on individual governmental actions. Thus, the current sanctioning system is
unlikely to be effective.
Similarly, the levels of international outrage and publicity are likely to be
less than those surrounding violations of other human rights. This may be due
to the susceptibility of certain violations, such as torture, to media
sensationalism, or it may be that because significant portions of the world have
strong religious convictions, the actions of government in the name of religion
seem less abhorrent than other motivations. Regardless, Iran's unwillingness,
and ultimately, inability to comply with the Covenant is unlikely to be able to
compete with stories about nuclear warheads and mass suicide bombings for a
place on the front page.
Is the United Nations, then, to give up? Is it to accept that a signatory of
one of its most important human rights treaties is to be eternally in violation of
it? Or is it simply to expel Iran from the treaty, doubtlessly causing an
international rift while at the same time ensuring that change does not occur?
Some might argue that UN forces should be deployed, but what country does
not have violations of the Covenant? 2 7 Which politician or world leader feels
126 Id at 47-49.
127 For example, in 2005, the Special Rapporteur reported violations by forty-two countries, including
world powers China, France, India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and
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confident enough in the strength of his glass house to throw the first stone? The
international community may be at an impasse. This author, however, believes
that there must be a solution and calls on the international legal community to
find it, for as the Qur'an clearly states, "there is no compulsion in religion.' 28
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